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ABSTRACT 
Since 2012, the Spacecraft Fire Experiment (Saffire) has 
been under development by the Spacecraft Fire Safety 
Demonstration (SFS Demo) project that is funded by 
NASA’s Advanced Exploration Systems Division in the 
Human Exploration and Operations Mission 
Directorate. The overall objective of this project is to 
reduce the uncertainty and risk associated with the 
design of spacecraft fire safety systems for NASA’s 
exploration missions. This is accomplished by defining, 
developing, and conducting experiments that address 
gaps in spacecraft fire safety knowledge and capabilities 
identified by NASA’s Fire Safety System Maturation 
Team. This paper describes the three Spacecraft Fire 
Experiments (Saffire-I, -II, and -III) that were 
developed at NASA-GRC and that will conduct a series 
of material flammability tests in low-gravity and at 
length scales that are realistic for a spacecraft fire. The 
experiments will be conducted in Orbital ATK’s 
Cygnus vehicle after it has unberthed from the 
International Space Station. The tests will be fully 
automated with the data downlinked at the conclusion of 
the test and before the Cygnus vehicle reenters the 
atmosphere. The objectives of these experiments are to 
(1) determine how rapidly a large scale fire grows in 
low-gravity and (2) investigate the low-g flammability 
limits compared to those obtained in NASA’s normal 
gravity material flammability screening test. The 
hardware for these experiments has been completed and 
is awaiting their respective launches, all planned for 
2016. This paper will review the objectives of these 
experiments and how they address several of the 
knowledge gaps for NASA’s exploration missions. The 
hardware development will be discussed including 
several novel approaches that were taken for testing and 
evaluation of these series payloads. The status of the 
missions and operational status will also be presented. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Tests on full-scale transportation vehicles, buildings, 
homes, and habitats have been common on earth to 
more fully understand the fire hazards associated with 
each application and how best to protect the passengers 
and inhabitants from a potential fire. Fire safety on 
spacecraft has been a significant concern for NASA 
during the decades of crewed spaceflight and will 
remain so as NASA plans future exploration missions.  
Many microgravity combustion experiments have been 
performed on the Space Shuttle and continue to be 
performed on the International Space States (ISS) and 
the data from these experiments have contributed to our 
understanding of how to prevent and protect crewed 
spacecraft from fire. However, none of these 
experiments have studied sample and environment sizes 
typical of those expected in a spacecraft fire [1]. Prior 
experiments have been limited to samples no larger than 
10 cm in length and width whereas a serious spacecraft 
fire would likely be much larger and consume much 
more material. Because of the large differences between 
fire behavior in normal and reduced gravity, there is a 
significant lack of data available for spacecraft 
designers on which to base their fire safety designs and 
procedures. The use of terrestrial fires and fire standards 
to design spacecraft fire safety systems presents an 
inherent risk to the vehicle because of the significant 
level of uncertainty. While this approach has been 
successful thus far, the uncertainty and risk will increase 
as exploration missions venture further from earth with 
considerably longer transit times for a safe return. 
Despite their obvious importance, full scale spacecraft 
fire experiments have not been possible because of the 
inherent hazards involved with conducting a large fire 
test in a crewed vehicle. To address this knowledge gap, 
a project was proposed to conduct large-scale fire safety 
experiments in an expendable spacecraft without risk to 
a crew. 
In October 2011, the NASA Advanced Exploration 
Systems (AES) Division of NASA’s Human 
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate funded 
this project to develop and demonstrate spacecraft fire 
safety technologies in relevant environments. The 
keystone demonstration to be performed was a large-
scale fire safety experiment to be conducted on an ISS 
re-supply vehicle after it has left the ISS and before it 
enters the earth’s atmosphere. The project team led from 
NASA’s John H. Glenn Research Center (GRC) was 
identified and began formulating such an experiment. 
The NASA team was augmented by an international 
topical team assembled by the European Space Agency 
(ESA) [2]. The participation of members from other 
countries and space agencies not only brings additional 
skills to the science team but also facilitates 
international cooperation in the development of an 
approach to spacecraft fire prevention and response for 
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 future exploration vehicles. The current spaceflight 
experiment funded and being developed by NASA 
addresses two objectives. The first objective is to 
understand the flame spread and growth of a fire over a 
large piece of flammable material, consistent with 
clothing or other fabric likely to be in a spacecraft 
cabin. This sample material is approximately 0.94 
meters long and 0.4 meters wide. This will be at least an 
order of magnitude larger in both dimensions than any 
prior low-g flame spread experiment. The second 
objective is to examine the flammability limits of 
materials in low gravity for comparison with results of 
NASA’s terrestrial normal gravity evaluation tests. The 
status of the development of the flight experiment and 
the individual contributions of the topical team will be 
discussed in subsequent sections. 
 
2. EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION 
The premise for the design of the flight experiment 
was that practically all of the hardware would be 
identical in the three units except possibly for the 
sample material(s) to be burned. The concept for this 
experiment focuses on conducting two types of material 
combustion tests to be performed on different flights of 
the Cygnus vehicle. The experiment package consists of 
a flow duct and an adjacent avionics bay. A schematic 
of the flow duct is shown in Fig. 1. The flow duct forms 
the primary chamber of the experiment while the 
avionics bay is connected to the side of the flow duct as 
shown in the figure. A LexanTM panel forms the wall 
between the flow duct and the avionics bay. Air is 
drawn through the flow duct by fans located at the top 
of the duct with flow straighteners at the bottom of the 
experiment module. The flow duct/avionics bay 
assembly is a rigid structure and will be secured with 
the standard stowage straps used in the Cygnus vehicle. 
This duct will provide a uniform flow across the 
samples, maintain a clear flow path within the 
experiment module, and prevent burning debris from 
interacting with the rest of the cargo. The sample card is 
positioned in the center of the flow duct as shown in 
Fig. 1. 
 
2.1 Sample Materials 
The sample material for Saffire-I and III is a composite 
fabric consisting of cotton on a fiberglass substrate 
(75% cotton, 25% fiberglass by weight). It is called 
SIBAL cloth because it was developed for the Solid 
Inflammability Boundary at Low-Speeds (SIBAL) 
spaceflight experiment and has been used in many space 
experiments because it burns like cotton but maintains 
structural integrity after the cotton is consumed. The 
objective of the Saffire-I and III tests will be to 
determine how rapidly a large-scale fire grows in low-
gravity and whether it reaches a steady-state spread rate. 
Saffire-I will be conducted at an air flow velocity of 20 
cm/s while Saffire-III will be run at a flow velocity of 
30 cm/s . 
 
Saffire-II has a sample card that contains 9 samples, 
each 5 cm x 29 cm. Table 1 lists the samples contained 
on Saffire-II while Fig. 2 shows their locations on the 
sample card. These materials were selected because they 
have normal gravity Maximum Oxygen Concentration 
(MOC) flammability limits that indicate they will burn 
in normal gravity just above and below 21% O2 by 
volume, i.e., the expected concentration of O2 when 
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Figure 1: Schematic of the Spacecraft Fire Safety 
Demonstration Experiment. The experiment module 
consists of a flow duct containing the sample card 
and an avionics bay. All power, computer, and data 
acquisition modules are contained in the bay. The 
experiment module is approximately 53- by 90- by 
133-cm. 
 Cygnus unberths from ISS. Drop tower testing has 
demonstrated the MOC flammability limits of a material 
can be different in low-g than in normal gravity [3-5]. 
Therefore, the objective of the Saffire-II tests is to 
quantify that affect in long-duration low-gravity using 
samples of the same size as those used in the in NASA-
STD-6001 Test 1 normal-gravity tests [3]. Some of 
these samples are expected to burn while others may 
not. 
 
Quantifying the difference in flammability limits for 
large samples is the objective of the Saffire-II 
experiments. 
2.2 Diagnostics 
Camera images of the flame are the primary data 
measurement obtained from the Saffire experiment but 
there are other diagnostics to measure other flow, flame, 
and atmospheric parameters. The diagnostic suite used 
in Saffire are shown in Table 2. The primary experiment 
data will be provided by two cameras that view one side 
of the sample card. 
 
2.3 Experiment Development 
The Saffire flight systems (hardware and software) 
underwent the NASA flight experiment development 
reviews and testing although these processes were 
heavily tailored to realize savings in cost and schedule. 
Because all three units were being developed in parallel, 
some components were ready to progress to the next 
development phase before the entire system for all three 
units had completed that phase. The logic behind the 
tailoring was to tailor the review criteria to allow 
components that were ready to progress onto the next 
development phase while the remainder of the system 
was completed. Given the design of the system and the 
risk tolerance advocated by the Advanced Exploration 
Systems Division, this approach was warranted. A 
Mission Concept Review/System Requirements Review 
was held in November 2012 and followed 
approximately 7 months later by a Periodic Technical 
Review-1 (PTR-1) that combined NASA’s typical 
Preliminary Design Review/Critical Design Review. 
 
Fabrication of the mechanical components for Saffire-I 
was performed at NASA-GRC to ensure the accuracy of 
the drawings. NASA’s Fabrication Alliance, a 
coordination of the fabrication shops at all NASA 
centers, was used to manufacture some of the 
components for Saffire-II and III again to help maintain 
project schedule without being limited by the staffing 
demands of other projects at NASA-GRC. Components 
for the second and third flight units was performed by 
the Fabrication Shops at NASA Johnson Space Center 
(JSC) and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). All 
avionics manufacturing was conducted at NASA-GRC. 
 
Periodic Technical Review-2, a tailored System 
Integration Review marking the start of system 
assembly was held in February 2014 with the assembly 
of the flight system being completed in October 2014. 
Because of the similarity of the slight systems and the 
risk posture of AES projects, the project tailored the 
approach to environmental testing and functional 
testing. Table 3 shows the environmental tests 
performed on each flight unit along with the date this 
testing began. 
 
Various levels of functional testing was performed on 
all three flight units before and after all environmental 
testing to verify the health of the flight unit being tested 
and to collect performance data. Additional functional 
testing was performed throughout 2015 for validation 
and verification of software and other systems. These 
test results were compared across all three flight units to 
Table 2. Saffire-I, II, and III Diagnostics 
Measurement Method Location
Flow temperature thermocouples inlet and outlet of flow duct
Flame temperature thermocouples embedded in sample
Plume temperature thermoocouple
Flame radiation radiometers two viewing front of sample; 
two viewing back of sample
CO2 mole fraction solid‐state sensor in avionics bay
O2 mole fraction solid‐state sensor inlet to avionics bay
Pressure solid‐state 
sensor
in avionics bay
Flow velocity anemometers one on each side of sample
Flame image cameras two viewing front of sample
Flow uniformity smoke wire leading edge of sample 
 
Table 1. Saffire-II Samples 
Sample 
Number
Material Sample 
Thickness
Air Flow 
(cm/s)
Igniter 
Position
S1 Silicone 0.25 mm 20 Upstream
S2 Silicone 0.61 mm 20 Upstream
S3 Silicone 1.02 mm 20 Upstream
S4 Silicone 0.36 mm 20 Downstream
S5 SIBAL fabric 0.33 mm 20 Upstream
S6 SIBAL fabric 0.33 mm 30 Upstream
S7 PMMA to 
Nomex
0.33 mm 20 Upstream
S8 Structured 
PMMA
10 mm (with 
tapered edge 
for ignition)
20 Upstream
S9 Flat PMMA
10 mm (with 
tapered edge 
for ignition)
30 Upstream
 verify and demonstrate consistency between the flight 
units. The System Acceptance Review marking the 
completion of the flight hardware was held in 
September 2015. 
 
2.4 Launch and Operation 
The Saffire-I flight unit was successfully launched 
within the Cygnus PCM on an Atlas V launch vehicle 
on March 22, 2016 as part of the OA-6 mission. The 
Cygnus vehicle was successfully berthed to the ISS on 
March 26, 2016. As of the writing of this paper, the un-
berthing of the Cygnus is scheduled for June 2, 2016 
and Saffire-I is scheduled to operate a few hours 
afterwards. Data from Saffire-I will be downlinked over 
the next several days prior to destructive re-entry of 
Cygnus about June 10. Saffire-II and III are planned to 
launch from the Wallops Flight Facility on Orbital 
ATK’s Antares rocket with the tentative dates shown in 
Table 4. 
 
3. SAFFIRE EXPERIMENT SAFETY 
Even though this experiment will be conducted during 
the un-crewed portion of the flight, the Cygnus vehicle 
berths with the ISS and, therefore, the experiment is 
subject to many of the same safety considerations as 
other ISS payloads. The major safety hazard is 
inadvertent igniter activation prior to the Cygnus de-
berthing from the ISS. This would result in the exposure 
of the flight crew to toxic gases that are produced from 
the combustion event. It should be noted that this hazard 
is a concern prior to Cygnus berthing to the ISS since 
the toxic gases would be present when the Cygnus hatch 
is opened to the ISS. The power and communication 
interfaces between Cygnus and Saffire are utilized to 
control this hazard. Cygnus provides two power feed 
circuits to Saffire due to power requirements. One 
power feed circuit provides power to the Saffire 
avionics, the other provides power to the igniter 
circuitry. There are two latching relays in each of these 
two power feed circuits, one in the power feed side, one 
in the return. These four latching relays are contained 
within the Saffire flight unit but are controlled and 
monitored by Cygnus avionics.  A separate ground 
command to the Cygnus avionics is required to close 
each of these four latching relays. Igniter activation 
requires that all four relays be closed. This is because 
Saffire avionics provides an enable command to a 
DC/DC converter in the igniter circuitry and also 
provides commanding to solid state relay switches on 
the igniter control card within the igniter power feed 
circuitry. In addition, a ground command to the Saffire 
avionics via Cygnus avionics is required to initiate an 
igniter activation for an experiment run. Cygnus 
avionics and the associated ground commanding 
provide the required failure tolerance for control of the 
Saffire hazard of inadvertent igniter activation.  
 
Significant focus was placed on these four latching 
relays due to their safety criticality. This attention is 
reflected in the environmental testing performed as 
shown in Table 3. The relays for all three flight units 
were vibration tested at the component level. Tailoring 
of the environmental testing resulted in only Saffire I 
being vibration tested at a system level. Therefore, 
vibration testing was performed on the Saffire II and III 
Power Management Systems that includes the relays to 
address the criticality of these relays and the associated 
risk of this tailored system-level vibration testing. 
Safety engineering input was critical to developing a 
design solution that was acceptable from an ISS payload 
safety perspective due to the interface limitations 
between Saffire and Cygnus. 
 
This hazard along with the other typical ISS payloads 
hazards are documented in the Saffire Unit I Flight 
Safety Data Package. The ISS Payload Safety Review 
Panel (PSRP) reviewed and approved this Package at 
the Phase I/II level in August of 2013 and again at the 
Phase III level in March 2015. These Payload Safety 
Reviews were augmented by a handful of Technical 
Interchange Meetings (TIMs) with the PSRP including 
TIMs to address the inadvertent igniter activation 
hazard. These TIMs were of tremendous value in the 
overall safety approval process by providing a focused 
review of specific safety issues. 
 
Table 3. Summary of Saffire Environmental 
Tests 
I II III
Safety‐critical Relay 
Component Vibe Test Nov‐13 Nov‐13 Nov‐13
Camera Component Vibe 
Test
Dec‐13 Dec‐13 Dec‐13
Power Management 
System Vibe Test ‐‐ Mar‐14 Mar‐14
System Vibe Test Oct‐14 ‐‐ ‐‐
System Thermal Test Nov‐14 Oct‐14 Nov‐14
Off‐gas System Test ‐‐
Nov‐14
(samples 
only)
Nov‐14
EMI/EMC System Test Dec‐14 Jan‐15 Feb‐15
Saffire Unit/DateTest
Table 4. Launch and Operation Dates for Saffire-
I-III (as of 4/30/2016) 
Mission Launch Operations
Saffire‐I OA‐6 22‐Mar‐2016 2‐Jun‐2016
Saffire‐II OA‐5 NET 6‐July‐2016 19‐Sep‐2016
Saffire‐III OA‐7 30‐Dec‐2016 3‐Mar‐2017
NET ‐ no earlier than
 4. SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY KNOWLEDGE 
GAPS AND FUTURE EXPERIMENTS 
The experiments being developed for Saffire-I, -II, and 
–III will be the first of their kind to evaluate low-g 
material flammability with direct implications for fire 
safety on future exploration vehicles. One of the 
drawbacks of these experiments is that a relatively small 
number of tests will be conducted (two large samples 
and nine smaller samples). A thorough evaluation of 
these phenomena would require many more samples 
and range of materials. Also, if they are typical of most 
low-g combustion experiments, the findings will raise 
additional significant questions for material 
flammability in spacecraft. The Saffire hardware and the 
Cygnus vehicle provides a unique opportunity to 
demonstrate other fire safety technologies including fire 
detection, fire suppression, post-fire cleanup and 
monitoring. Needs in these areas have been identified 
by NASA’s Spacecraft Fire Safety Systems Maturation 
Team and are summarized in Table 5. Because of the 
importance of addressing these remaining needs to crew 
safety in exploration missions, AES management 
authorized the SFS Demo project to plan for three more 
Saffire experiments, Saffire-IV, V, and VI, that will 
address objectives not achieved in Saffire-I-III. Of 
particular note is that many of these objectives require 
supporting ground-based experimentation to perform 
the parametric investigations that are required to fully 
understand the phenomena in question. The objective of 
the flight experiment is to anchor the ground-based 
experiments with flight data. 
 
While the planning for the follow-on experiments is 
underway, the development process is intended to 
mirror the processes executed with Saffire-I-III. The 
Mission Concept Review/System Requirements Review 
is planned for June 2016 with a design review planned 
for December 2016. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The Spacecraft Fire Safety Demonstration Project has 
designed, manufactured, assembled and tested three 
Saffire flight units. The decision to develop flight units 
of nearly identical design allowed for the tailoring of 
environmentally testing that resulted in cost and 
schedule savings without introducing significant risk. 
This design similarity also allowed for the comparison 
of test results to verify consistency when testing was 
performed across all three flight units. Safety 
engineering input was critical to developing an 
acceptable design solution to control the inadvertent 
igniter activation hazard due to the interface limitations 
between Saffire and Cygnus. Technical Interchange 
Meetings (TIMs) with the ISS Payload Safety Review 
Panel proved to be invaluable to the overall safety 
approval process by providing a focused review of 
specific safety issues. 
 
Conducting these three experiments will be a milestone 
for spacecraft fire safety. The data and follow on 
analysis will provide verification of spacecraft fire 
safety design and operations for future exploration 
vehicles and their crews. Development of the Saffire-IV 
– VI flight units will extend spacecraft fire safety 
knowledge related to the combustion by-products and 
fire detection. 
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Table 5. Spacecraft Fire Safety Demonstration Experiment Objectives 
Area Objective Comment Saffire-I, II, III
Saffire-IV, 
V, VI Ground
Fire behavior/modeling: 
Quantify growth and end state of realistic fires 
in spacecraft and their influence on vehicle 
habitability
Require to validate computational 
models X X
 Flame behavior in complex geometries More realistic configurations than Saffire-I, II, and III X
Flame behavior for planar and complex 
geometries in exploration atmospheres 
Elevated O2, lower P; compare with 
Saffire-I, II, III; supplement small-scale 
tests in Combustion Integrated Rack
X
Measure flame behavior over large-scale 
planar surfaces Continues Saffire-I and III investigations X X
Post-fire monitoring Demonstrate performance of prototype Orion and ISS combustion product monitor
Demonstration of prototype flight 
hardware X X
Obtain data to validate transport and detection 
models Required for model development X X
Demonstrate fire detection with multi-moment 
sensors
Demonstrate capability to reject 
nuisance alarms X
Evaluate performance of hybrid fire detection 
(smoke and gaseous products)
Combustion product detection by 
prototype combustion product monitor X
Post-fire monitoring Quantify rate of decay of gas species after a spacecraft fire Required for model development X X
Post-fire cleanup Quantify atmosphere cleanup rate with prototype smoke-eater Demo of prototype flight hardware X X
Fire Suppression Performance of low-momentum water mist suppression
Effectiveness of fire ports using water 
mist fire suppression X
Fire growth/dynamics
Fire Detection
 experiments. The members are: Gary A. Ruff , David L. 
Urban, and Sandra Olson (NASA Glenn Research 
Center), Carlos Fernandez-Pello (UC Berkeley), James 
S. T’ien and Ya-Ting Liao (Case Western Reserve 
University), Jose L. Torero (University of Queensland, 
Brisbane, Australia), Guillaume Legros (Université 
Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris, France), Christian 
Eigenbrod (University of Bremen (ZARM), Bremen, 
Germany), Nickolay Smirnov (Moscow Lomonosov 
State University, Moscow, Russia), Osamu Fujita 
(Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan), Sebastien 
Rouvreau (Belisama R&D, Toulouse, France), Balazs 
Toth (ESA ESTEC, Noordwijk, Netherlands), and 
Grunde Jomaas (Technical University of Denmark, Kgs. 
Lyngby, Denmark). 
 
The Spacecraft Fire Safety Demonstration project is 
funded by the Advanced Exploration Systems Division 
in NASA’s Human Exploration and Operations Mission 
Directorate. 
 
7. REFERENCES 
1. Ruff, G.A., Urban, D.L., Pedley, M.D., Johnson, 
P.T., Safety Design for Space Systems edited by 
Gary Musgrave et al. Chapter 27 “Fire Safety,” 
Elsevier, 2009. 
2. Ruff, G.A., Urban, D.L., Fernandezs-Pello A.C., 
T’ien, J.S., Torero, K. L., Legros, G., Eigenbrod, C., 
Smirnov, N., Fujita, O., Cowlard, A.J., Rouvreau, 
S., Minster, O., Toth, B., and Jomaas, G. (2013) 
Development of Large-Scale Spacecraft Fire Safety 
Experiments, Paper No. AIAA-2013-3410, 2013 
International Conference on Environmental 
Systems, Vail, CO. 
3. Hirsch, D.B., Williams, J.H., Haas, J.P., Beeson, 
H.D., and Pedley, M.D., “Oxygen Concentration 
Flammability Thresholds of Selected Aerospace 
Materials Considered for the Constellation 
Program,” Proceedings of the 2nd IAASS 
Conference, Chicago, May 14-16, 2007; (also ESA 
SP-645, July 2007). 
4. Olson, S.L., Ruff, G.A., Miller, F.J., Microgravity 
Flame Spread in Exploration Atmospheres: 
Pressure, Oxygen, and Velocity Effects on Opposed 
and Concurrent Flame Spread,” Paper No. 2008-01-
2005, 38th International Conference on 
Environmental Systems, San Francisco, CA, June 
29-July 2, 2008. 
5. Olson, S.L., Hirsch, D.B., and Ferkul, P.V., 
“Improving Materials Flammability Screening For 
Spacecraft Fire Safety,” Proceedings of the 2010 
Technical Meeting of the Central States Section of 
the Combustion Institute, Champaign, Illinois, 
March 2010. 
 
 
 
